The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines under the Japanese Constitution and Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy by Ajemian, Chris
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 7 Number 2 
3-1-1998 
The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines under the Japanese 
Constitution and Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy 
Chris Ajemian 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
Digital 
Commons 
Network 
Logo 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the National Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chris Ajemian, Comment, The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines under the Japanese Constitution and 
Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 323 (1998). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol7/iss2/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 1998 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association
THE 1997 U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE GUIDELINES
UNDER THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Chris Ajemian t
Abstract: The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines represent additional
commitment by Japan to the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the primary source of
Northeast Asian security and stability. Certain tasks within Japan's enhanced role raise
questions of whether the Guidelines are compatible with Article 9 of Japan's
Constitution. On its face, Article 9 renounces Japan's right to wage war or maintain
military force, yet it has been interpreted to allow a defensively-oriented, though
massive, military. Based on the existing interpretation of Article 9, it is likely that
Japan will declare its new role under the Guidelines constitutional. U.S. policy toward
Japan in the short-term is to clarify the division of roles in the alliance to stabilize
Northeast Asia. This Comment argues that the U.S. security guarantee prevents Japan
from acting like a self-sufficient country. Consequently, U.S. long-term policy should be
to withdraw from the role of Japan's protector wherever possible to encourage Japan to
act more like a leader internationally.
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the United States and Japan is typically
viewed in economic terms. However, although much less visible, their
defense relationship is at least as important. As part of their developing
post-cold war security strategy, in September 1997 the United States and
Japan announced2 updates to the 1978 Defense Guidelines.' The 1997
Guidelines4 revise each partner's respective roles in coordinated responses to
military conflict in Northeast Asia. Their primary purpose is to clarify the
B.A., History (University of California, Berkeley), M.A. (Japan Studies, The Henry M. Jackson
School of International Studies, University of Washington).
1 See Takuma Takahashi, Economic Interdependence and Security in the East Asia-Pacific
Region, in TOWARD A TRUE ALLIANCE 96, 124-27, (Mike Mochizuki ed., 1997).
2 U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, COMPLETION OF THE REVIEW OF THE
GUIDELINES FOR U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION (1997), available in Japan Self Defense Forces Web
Page <http://www.jda.go.jp/policy/fLwork/sisin4_.htm> [hereinafter COMPLETION OF THE REVIEW].
3 THE DEFENSE AGENCY, JAPAN, GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION (1978), in
DEFENSE OF JAPAN 1979 (WHITE PAPER) 187-93 (MAINICHI DAILY NEWS trans., 1979) [hereinafter 1978
GUIDELINES].
' U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, THE GUIDELINES FOR U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE
COOPERATION (1997), available in Japan Self Defense Forces Web Page <http://www.jda.go.jp/policy/
f work/sisin4_.htm> [hereinafter 1997 GUIDELINES].
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partners' relationship under the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 5 which has
been the United States' foundation for security in Asia since the end of World
War 11.6 Under the new Guidelines, Japan's role in joint U.S.-Japan military
operations marks not only an increased level of defense burdensharing for
Japan,7 but also a move toward taking greater responsibility for its own
defense.
On another level, the public nature of the U.S.-Japan announcement
indicates a more strategic purpose of the Guidelines. That is, the 1997
Guidelines are intended to help stabilize the political tension in the Taiwan
Straits and the Korean Peninsula. 8  These two regions have the greatest
potential for full-scale war anywhere in the world because they are home to
the only countries still divided after WWII.
Currently, the U.S. security guarantee prevents Japan from acting like a
self-sufficient country. The new Guidelines appear to be one step in many
toward a long-term strategic policy which shifts security responsibility from
the U.S. to Japan, a shift which observers see someday leading to Japan
acting more as an equal partner to the U.S in international security matters. 9
Whether Japan can implement domestic legislation allowing it to
perform its expanded military role under the Guidelines, however, has yet to
be decided. On its face, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution1° prohibits the
use of aggression to settle international disputes."1 Thus, whether Japan
interprets its constitution in a way that permits it to engage in defensive
military force outside the immediate confines of the Japanese archipelago, as
agreed in the 1997 Defense Guidelines, has broad implications for U.S.
foreign policy in Northeast Asia.
Part II of this Comment begins by explaining the cold war background
from which the Defense Guidelines originated. Part III examines the
' Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan,
Jan. 19, 1960, U.S.-Japan, II U.S.T. 1632 [hereinafter 1960 Treaty].6 William Cohen, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Prepared Statement before the Asia Society, June 11, 1997,
at 3, available in U.S. Department of Defense, DefenseLINK, <http://www.defenselink.nil>.
7 Robert Manning, U.S., Japan Deepen Defense Ties-and China Gets Nervous, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997.
8 Id.
9 Mike Mochizuki, A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance, in TowARD A TRUE ALLIANCE, supra
note 1, at 5. 7 [hereinafter Mochizuki, New Bargain].1o KENPO [CONSTITUIrON], art. 9. The English translation of Japan's constitution cited in this
Comment is the U.S. State Department version. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN,
PUBLICATION 2836, FAR EASTERN SERIES 22 (1947).
" KENPO [CONSTITUTION], art. 9; Kendrick Royer, The Demise of the World's First Pacifist
Constitution: Japanese Constitutional Interpretation and the Growth of Executive Power to Make War,
26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 749, 752 (1993).
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treatment of Article 9 by Japan's judiciary, its political leadership, and
Japan's public. Part IV discusses the need for the 1997 Guidelines, examines
their content, and then predicts that Japan will ultimately declare its role
under the Guidelines to be constitutional. Finally, this Comment explains
recent developments in Northeast Asia, and then makes recommendations for
U.S. foreign policy depending on whether Japan declares the new Guidelines
constitutional. This Comment concludes by arguing that the U.S. will be able
to rely upon Japan for performance of its Guidelines role. U.S. foreign policy
should be to withdraw from the role of Japan's protector wherever possible
so that Japan can assume the roles and responsibilities of a world leader.
II. THE COLD WAR
During the cold war, the U.S.-Japan security alliance not only
contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union1 2 and kept a check on
Chinese expansion,13 it also permitted the steep and unfettered rise of Japan
as a global economic superpower. 14  Together, the U.S.-Japan alliance in
Northeast Asia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") in
Western Europe made up the respective eastern and western components of
the U.S. policy of containment which was designed to deter the Soviet Union
and China.' 5 Coordination between these two sets of allies reached its peak
during the Korean and Vietnam wars.16  The U.S. postwar occupation of
Japan permitted the U.S. to position Japan, a former enemy, as a U.S. ally in
the cold war.
17
The Defense Guidelines and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty they
clarify grew out of a relationship born from the necessities of the cold war. 18
12 See Seizaburo Sato & Yuji Suzuki, A New Stage of the United States-Japan Alliance, in SHARING
WORLD LEADERSHIP? 153, 154-55, 166 (John Makin & Donald Hellmann eds., 1989).
"3 See id at 156-57.
14 Donald Hellmann, The Imperatives for Reciprocity and Symmetry in U.S. -Japanese Economic
and Defense Relations, in SHARING WORLD LEADERSHIP?, supra note 12, at 237, 237-38.
15 J.W. DOWER, EMPIRE AND AFTERMATH: YOSIIDA SHIGERU AND THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE 1878-
1954, at 419 (1979).
16 KENNETH PYLE, THE JAPANESE QUESTION: POWER AND PURPOSE IN A NEW ERA 25, 34-35 (2d ed.
1996). Japan served as the primary staging area and goods supplier for the U.S. to conduct its wars on the
Korean peninsula and in Vietnam. Id.
" Id The Containment Doctrine was the U.S. global cold war security strategy intended to defeat
communism. Its central premise was that the combined military power of the U.S. and its allies was
insufficient to defeat the military power of communist countries. Therefore, the U.S. should attempt only
to contain further expansion of communism and wait for it to collapse of its own accord. See STEPHEN
AMBROSE, RISE TOGLOBALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1938 182, 214, 264 (4th ed. 1985).
1 Id
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The U.S. would defend Japan in exchange for Japan's willingness to provide
the U.S. access to military bases in Japanese territory.19
This one-way U.S. guarantee of Japan's security, where Japan commits
to little in return for the U.S., has been referred to as the "political
greenhouse., 20  During the cold war, the U.S. shielded Japan not only from
the military threats from the Soviet Union and China as well as the associated
economic costs of not having to participate in either the Korean or Vietnam
Wars as many other countries did, but also from the social and psychological
strain that accompanies decisions of whether to commit troops to United
Nations peace-keeping activities or other world conflicts. 2' From the end of
WWII until after the Persian Gulf War, Japan did not participate in any U.N
operation.
22
An important effect of the U.S. security guarantee was the placation of
Japan's neighbors who were fearful of a reemergence of Japan's fascist and
expansionary past.23 Because of the long standing dominance of the U.S. in
this security alliance, the U.S. was in a position to closely monitor Japan's
military capabilities. Consequently, Japan's neighbors were somewhat
reassured Japan would not invade their countries again.24 In addition, Japan
benefited economically: with national defense safely aside, Japan was free to
concentrate its society's entire productivity on commercial ventures.25
III. ARTICLE 9 OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
The legal basis for Japan's abstention from security matters during the
cold war is Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.2 6 Article 9 states:
'9 Mochizuki, New Bargain, supra note 1, at 7.
20 Hellmann, supra note 14, at 237.
21 See id
22 The first U.N. peacekeeping operation Japan participated in was the non-combatant 1992
Cambodian election monitoring. See infra note 106.
23 Mochizuki, New Bargain, supra note 1, at 6.
24 PYLE, supra note 16, at 23-24.
25 Id. at 122. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru implemented policies and programs thatinstitutionalized Japan's stance domestically and enabled it to receive continued security protection from
the U.S. Id. at 25. Kenneth Pyle, Professor of History and Asian studies at the Jackson School of
International Studies, University of Washington (former Director), refers to these policies as "the Yoshida
Doctrine." Id In addition to allowing Japan's conservative political leadership control for over forty
years, the Doctrine also permitted Japan's leaders to shrewdly avoid any substantial international
commitment that did not further their own narrowly-defined goals of economic reconstruction and
competitiveness. Id. at 25-26, 34, 43.
26 KENPO [CONSTITUTION], art. 9.
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The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of
settling international disputes. [Lland, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.27
This provision controls the use of Japan's military force by limiting
the actions in which Japan's Self-Defense Forces ("SDF") may engage as
well as the international military agreements into which Japan may enter.28
Thus, to be implemented, the Guidelines must be consistent with Article 9.
Because there has been intense and continuing debate in Japan over
the meaning of Article 9, the question of who interprets the constitution in
Japan is often raised.29 As in other countries, the Japanese Supreme Court
has this duty.30 However, the Japanese Supreme Court has ruled that the
interpretation of Article 9 is a political question. 3' The Court has deferred
to the Diet, Japan's Parliament, to give Article 9 meaning, while reserving
the right to intervene should that meaning clearly exceed constitutional
norms.
32
Thus, the interpretation of Article 9 determines whether Japan can
honor its commitments to the U.S. as enumerated in the 1997 Defense
Guidelines. This interpretation depends on legal,33 political, 34 and social
factors. 35  This combination of forces will affirm or deny the
constitutionality of the 1997 Defense Guidelines.
27 Id. (emphasis added).
28 LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970-1990, at
30 (1996). The SDF is composed of air, ground, and naval defensively-oriented forces. In accordance
with Article 9, the only armaments they may possess may be defensive in nature. For example, a fighter
jet may have guns, but no bombs.
29 James Auer, Article Nine: Renunciation of War, in CONSTrrUIONAL LAW IN JAPAN 69, 74-76
(Piercy Luney ed., 1993); see also Theodore McNeily, Foreword to OsAMU NISHI, THE CONSTITUION AND
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW SYSTEM IN JAPAN 1 (1987).
30 KENPO, supra note 10, art. 81.
31 For a detailed analysis of these rulings, see infra, discussion beginning at note 37, and
accompanying text.
32 See infra, discussion beginning at note 37, and accompanying text
33 Kisaburo Yokota, Political Questions and Judicial Review: A Comparison, 43 WASH. L. REV.
1031, 1052-54 (1967-68).
34 PYLE, supra note 16, at 124.
35 Robert Dekle, The Relationship Between Defense Spending and Economic Performance in
Japan, in SHARING WORLD LEADERSHIP?, supra note 12, at 127, 132-33.
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A. Article 9 as Defined by Japan's Judiciary
The first factor in the interpretation of Article 9 is Japan's judiciary.
The Japanese Supreme Court has refused to rule on the constitutionality of
the SDF and Japan's use of force.36 Instead, it has repeatedly deferred to
Japan's Diet and legislative body providing only broad boundaries. This
section discusses three judicial decisions which illustrate the Japanese
Supreme Court's interpretation of Article 9 as a political issue.
1. The Sunakawa Case
In 1959, the Supreme Court heard a case brought by land owners
against a Japanese radical group that had destroyed fences and interfered
with a survey of private property within Tachikawa Air Base, then used by
the U.S. military. 37  The defendants argued that the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty, under which U.S. use of the base was authorized, was
unconstitutional. 38  The Court held that self-defense was an inherent
sovereign right, but avoided specifically ruling on the legality of war
potential for self-defense, or, more specifically, the legality of the SDF.39
The Court instead declared that the constitutionality of the SDF was a
political issue and should be relegated to the Diet.40  This deferral set the
tone for later rulings.
36 Auer, supra note 29, at 80-82; Tomosuke Kasuya, Constitutional Transformation and the Ninth
Article of the Japanese Constitution, 18 L. JAPAN 1, 21 (Paul Taylor trans., 1985); Robert B. Funk,Japan's Constitution and U.N Obligations in the Persian Gulf War: The Case for Non-Military
Participation in U.N. Enforcement Actions, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 363, 381-82 (1992).31 Judgment of Dec. 16, 1959 (Japan v Sakata, Sup. CL, G.B.), 13 SAIKO SAmANSHO KEri HANREISHU
3225, translated in 4 SERIES OF PROMINENT JUDGEMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT UPON QUESTIONS OF
CONSTrrJTIONALITY2, 3-4, 6 (1960). Auer, supra note 29, at 80; Funk, supra note 36, at 380-81.38 Auer, supra note 29, at 80.39 Id. at 80-81; Funk, supra note 36, at 380-81. The constitutionality of the SDF was challenged forthe first time in the Eniwa case. Id. at 381 (citing Judgment of Oct. 8, 1952 (Eniwa Case, Sup. Ct.), 6MINSHO 783). In that case, the prosecution argued that Japan's inherent right to self-defense, stronglyimplied later by Sunakawa, extended to the SDF. Id. The facts of the case involved two ranchers who cuttelephone wires leading to a neighboring SDF base to disrupt training missions hoping to reduce the
associated noise. Id. They were charged with damaging military equipment in violation of the SDF law.Id. The Sapporo District Court refused to extend Sunakawa to the SDF, and instead dismissed the case onground that the ranchers' act did not constitute destruction of military property. Id40 Yokota, supra note 33, at 1037-38.
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2. The Naganuma Nike Base Case
In the Naganuma Nike Base case, the Defense Agency wanted to build a
missile base on the island of Hokkaido as part of the 1967-1971 Defense Build-
Up Program.4 Local residents protested and brought legal action against the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.42 In a surprise 1973 ruling, the Sapporo
District Court43 held that the SDF was comprised of military units and thus was
unconstitutional. 44 The court ordered the Ministry to retract its permit, thus
denying the Defense Agency's use of the forestry preserve.45 Although the court
affirmed Japan's right of self-defense as an independent state, the court stated
that this right should be achieved through diplomacy, police action, revolution by
the masses, confiscation of the property of citizens from aggressor nations,
deportations, and other non-military measures.46
On appeal, the Sapporo High Court reversed the District Court on grounds
that the plaintiff lacked standing.47 The high court noted in dicta, however, that
Paragraph 1 of Article 9 prohibits wars of aggression.48 Since then, the
Naganuma case has been construed to mean that the purpose, organization,
formation, and equipment of the SDF do not indicate aggression.49 Thus, an
appellate court once again effectively held that compatibility of the SDF and
Article 9 is a political question to the extent that the SDF and its mission are
defensive. The Supreme Court implicitly affirmed by ignoring the merits.50
3. The Hyakuri Base Case
The most recent of the three cases challenging the constitutionality of the
SDF is the Hyakuri Base case.51 In 1976, a farmer sold his property to a private
4' Auer, supra note 29, at 80 (discussing Judgment of Sept. 9, 1982 (Naganuma Nike Base Case,
Sup. Ct., 1982), 1054 HANREI JIHO 16); Osamu Nishi. Article 9 of the Constitution and the Self-Defense
Forces Law, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW SYSTEM IN JAPAN 1, 20 (Osa nu
Nishi ed.. 1987).
42 Auer, supra note 29, at 80; see also Nishi, supra, note 41, at 20.
43 Japanese High Courts are the equivalent of U.S. Federal Courts of Appeal.
44 Nishi, supra, note 41, at 21.
45 Id.
46 Auer, supra note 29, at 16; Nishi, supra note 41.
47 Auer, supra note 29, at 80.
41 Id. at 81.
49 Id.
so Auer, supra note 29, at 81.
S Nishi, supra note 41, at 23 (discussing Judgment of June 6, 1989 (Hyakuri Base Case, Sup. Ct.),
1318 HANREI JIHO 3).
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buyer in order to oppose the construction of an air-defense missile base.52 When
the buyer failed to pay, the fanner changed his mind.53  Along with the
government, he sued for his proprietary right so that he could then sell to the
government. 54 The Hyakuri District Court went further than any previous court,
however, by stating that self-defense for the purpose of preventing foreign attack
was constitutionally permissible. 55  The District Court found this narrowly-
defined concept of self-defense was a legal, rather than a political issue.56 The
constitutionality of the SDF's mission, however, remained a political issue. 57 On
appeal, the Tokyo High Court avoided the issue of constitutionality by
categorizing the case in civil terms.58 In 1989, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Tokyo High Court's categorization of the case, holding that Article 9 "does not
apply directly to private acts."59
These three cases show that the Japanese Supreme Court has developed a
pattern of deferral to the legislature on Article 9 matters. 60  Since the Court has
refused to hear subsequent cases and the Cabinet has not passed contravening
legislation,6' the Court's sole requirement for Article 9 is that the use of
defensive force is constitutional.62
52 Id.
53 id.
" Auer, supra note 29, at 81.
55 Id.
56 Id. The court's decision stated:
In effect, the use of the right of self-defense for the purpose of preventing and eliminating
armed foreign attacks and for organizing and equipping effective and appropriate defense
dispositions in advance does not violate Article 9 of the Constitution... [Article 9] does not
renounce wars for the purpose of self-defense. Our nation holds the right to defend itself and to
prevent and eliminate unjust foreign infringements. To exercise this right, proper defensive
action must inevitably be taken.
Id. (citing Judgment of June 6, 1989 (Hyakuri Base Case, Supt. Ct.), 1318 HANREI JiHO 3).57 Auer, supra note 29, at 81. The court continued:
The decision of whether the SDF exceed the necessary limits termed 'war potential' under
paragraph 2, Article 9 is, in principle, not under the jurisdiction of the courts of justice unless it
is clearly unconstitutional and invalid. This decision is primarily entrusted to the Diet, the
body that legislated the two defense laws and is therefore ultimately responsible to the Japanese
public.
Id. (citing Judgment of June 6, 1989 (Hyakuri Base Case, Supt. Ct.), 1318 HANREI JIHO 3).58 Nishi, supra note 41, at 24.
59 Auer, supra note 29, at 82.
60 Nishi, supra note 41, at 19.
61 No rulings have overturned Sunakawa. Interview with John 0. Haley, Director Asian LawProgram, University of Washington (Feb. 3, 1998).62 Nishi, supra note 41, at 22.
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B. Japan's Leadership and Its Interpretation ofArticle 9
The second factor in the interpretation of Article 9 is Japan's political
leadership. Japan's political leadership continually balances the practical
need for security with the ideological concerns of its population. On one
hand, during the cold war the U.S. occupation of Japan after WWII
temporarily removed the need for Japan to defend itself.63 On other hand, the
Korean War reminded Japan of its need for self-defense. 64 The public,
however, remained strongly fearful of anything resembling a return to Japan's
aggressive, expansionary, and fascist past.65 This tension between practical
and pacifist concerns has resulted in constant reinterpretation of Article 9.66
In the end, Japan realized the U.S. security guarantee went a long way toward
eliminating the need for practical concerns. 67 As mentioned earlier, Japan,
unlike many other countries, did not have to participate in either the Korean
or Vietnam wars. As a result, Japan was able to do something no powerful
country had done before-entertain pacifism as a realistic notion. Pacifism
was no longer philosophers' fare, it was the defense policy of Japan.
68
1. The Postwar Origin ofArticle 9 and "War Potential"
Shortly after Japan's defeat in WWII, Prime Minister Yoshida
addressed the issue of Japan's right to wage war. He noted that although
under international law, Japan had the right to defend itself, but because of
Article 9's restrictions he believed Japan still could not maintain armed forces
even for the purpose of national self-defense. 69 Moreover, Yoshida believed
that if Japan were attacked, it could rely on other countries for help.
70
Finally, he believed Japan could never begin to rebuild trust with its
neighbors if it did not make dramatic gestures correcting its WWII
aggression.
71
63 PYLE, supra note 16, at 28.
64 Royer, supra note 11, at 782.
65 Id.
66 JOHN MAKI, JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT 260 (John Maki
trans., ed., 1980).
'7 Mochizuki, New Bargain, supra note 1, at 6.
68 Mike Mochizuki, American and Japanese Strategic Debates, in TOWARD A TRUE ALLIANCE,
supra note 1, at 43, 66 [hereinafter Strategic Debates].
69 Auer, supra note 29, at 74.
'0 Id. at 72.
71 id.
MVARCH 1998
PACIFIC Rim LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Yoshida changed his position soon thereafter, however, asserting
Japan's right to self-defense. This change was made primarily to meet U.S.
conditions for large-scale military aid.72 In 1953, Yoshida indicated Article 9
was meant to prohibit "war potential" as a means of settling international
disputes.73 But, Article 9 did not prohibit the use of military power in self-
defense. 74  By 1955, official Diet policy reflected this Article 9 "no war
potential" interpretation: 75
The Constitution, while denouncing war, has not denounced war
for self-defense... To check armed attack in [the] event of such
an attack from outside is self-defense itself, and is entirely
different from settling international disputes. Hence, the case of
military power as a means of defending the nation when the
nation has been attacked by [a] military power is not counter to
[Article 9].76
The announcement of Japan's three non-nuclear principals followed.77 The
Cabinet pledged the government would not produce, possess, or permit
nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan.78
The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security took effect
in 1960. 79  There was nothing mutual or even equitable about the Treaty,
however.80  The bargain, taken literally, was that America would protect
72 Id at 75.
73 Id. On December 12, 1954, the year in which the SDF was formally inaugurated, DefenseAgency Director General Omura announced the Prime Minister Yoshida-inspired government view which
has endured in one form or another since:
The Constitution renounces war. However, it does not renounce wars for purpose of self-defense. Obstruction of armed interventions from abroad is in itself defense, and its essencediffers from that of solving international disputes. Thus, defending the nation through the use
of arms in cases of foreign attacks does not violate the Constitution. Article 9 recognizes the
right of self-defense of Japan, an independent nation. Hence the SDF, whose mission is todefend the nation, and the establishment of a capable corps with the necessary limits to serve
the purpose of self-defense do not violate the Constitution in any way.
Nishi, supra note 41, at 15, 55-57. Collective self-defense, that of coming to the aid of an ally in an
armed conflict, does exceed the minimum limit, and is therefore interpreted to be unconstitutional.
Id. at 12.
74 Id. at 74-75.
" Id at 76.76 Id. (citing K. MAsuHAt.A, NiHoN NoBOEI [JAP 's DEFENSE) 57, 58 (1961)).
77 PYLE, supra note 16, at 33.
78 Id.
79 1960 Treaty, supra note 5.
so Auer, supra note 29, at 76; 1960 Treaty, supra note 5, arts. V-VI.
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Japan and in return Japan would provide political support and territory for
U.S. military bases.8 1 Article IV of the Treaty extended security cooperation
with Japan to all of east Asia, and thus reveals the central U.S. reason for the
agreement-the cold war. 2 Article V requires each party to assist the other
in the event of an armed attack although, at the treaty's signing it was clear
that Japan would do little or nothing in its own defense.
Yet, by the late-1980s, the Japanese government's "no war potential"
interpretation of Article 9 had been utilized to increase Japan's SDF spending
to the third largest defense budget in the world. 3 What was once a modest
police force authorized by General MacArthur in the aftermath of Japan's
defeat, almost thirty years later had become the technologically-sophisticated
force that it is today.84 This change stemmed from U.S. pressure on Japan to
assume more of the burden for its own defense during the 1970 and '80s in
response to the Soviet Union's massive increase in armaments. 85 The 1981
U.S.-Japan division of defense responsibilities meant Japan would patrol out
to 1000 miles from its coasts. 86 This arrangement was not challenged further
until the Persian Gulf War.
2. Challenges to the Status Quo
The 1990 Persian Gulf War both epitomized what had become Japan's
characteristic approach to security matters and presented a challenge to the
status quo.87 Despite its near total dependence on the Gulf for oil, Japan
refused to commit troops to a United Nations-endorsed, multinational military
and peacekeeping operation conducted to keep the Gulf open.88 This refusal
engendered great international criticism.89 Article 9 first had been interpreted
as permitting self-defense to satisfy U.S. conditions for military protection,
but in 1990 it was invoked to avoid involvement in conflicts of international
8 Mochizuki, New Bargain, supra note 1, at 7.
82 1960 Treaty, supra note 5, art. IV: "The Parties will consult together from time to time
regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of
Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened."
83 Auer, supra note 29, at 77.
84 Id. at 75,83.
85 Nishi, supra note 41, at 4.
6 Auer, supra note 29, at 77-78.
W7 PYLE, supra note 16, at 125.
8 Id. at 15; Edward Balls, Japan, Oil Is the Dominating Factor-Middle East, FINANCIAL
TIMES, July 15, 1991, at 10; Takahashi, supra note 1, at 107. See generally KEUN-WOOK PAIK, GAS
& OIL IN NORTHEAST ASIA (1995).
,9 Akio Shibata, Japanese Peacekeeping Legislation and Recent Developments in U.N. Operations,
19 YALE J. INT'LL. 307, 309 (1994); PYLE, supra note 16, at 151.
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importance. 90 The Gulf War threw the country into upheaval and forced
Japan to confront the foreign policy issues it had evaded for so long.9 1
The ensuing debate centered on Japan's willingness to act in
conjunction with other countries for promotion of international peace. 92
Some commentators suggested amending Article 9.93 Opposition party and
mainstream conservatives took the position that Article 9 prohibited the
dispatch of the SDF abroad.94 To oppose amending Article 9, the then-ruling
Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP") played off the fears of Japan's pacifists by
suggesting Japan would invade its neighbors again as in WWII if the SDF
was ever sent abroad. 95 For example, Gotoda Masaharu, a senior LDP
member, predicted that if Article 9 were amended, "all restraints would
disappear. ''96  A statement of pacifism, advocated by a conservative
nationalist, shows the complexity of Article 9's meaning and the shrewdness
of the LDP in playing competing political forces off of each other.97
The immediate result of the debate brought on by the Gulf War was a
large monetary contribution by Japan to the American-led coalition, along
with a token force of SDF minesweepers which helped sweep the Gulf after
hostilities were over. 98 The government defended the constitutionality of the
mission on the grounds that a formal cease-fire existed, and that the purpose
of the mission to dispose of abandoned mines did not require the use of
force. 9 9
The government's long-term response to the international criticism it
received was the 1992 Law Concerning Cooperation in U.N. Peacekeeping
and Other Operations. 00 The law was a compromise between Japan's
acknowledgement' 0 of the need to support U.N. peace efforts and Article 9's
prohibition of aggression. 0 2  In accordance with the "no war potential"
90 Auer, supra note 29, at 78.
91 PYLE, supra note 16, at 127- 151-55.
92 Id. at 127-31.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 124.
9' Id. at 15.
Sid.
97 Id.
98 Shibata, supra note 89, at 316.
99 Id.
'00 Id. at 308; Kokusai Rengo Heiwa Iji Katsudo Nado ni Taisurn Ky6ryoku ni Kansuru Hdritsu[Law Concerning Cooperation in United Nations. Peacekeeping and Other Operations], Law No. 79 of
1992 [hereinafter Peacekeeping Law].
101 Shibata, supra note 89, at 309.02 Peacekeeping Law. Peacekeeping, like humanitarian relief or election monitoring, does not
require the use of force. Id. at 217.
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interpretation of Article 9, the Peacekeeping Law allows SDF participation in
U.N. peacekeeping assignments to prevent the recurrence of armed
conflicts. 10 3  The SDF may only do so after conflict has ended.1 0°4 SDF
personnel must act with impartiality, and with the consent of the host country
and the parties to the conflicts. 10 5 In carrying out their assignment, they can
only be armed with "small-sized weapons."' 0 6 Thus, in response to domestic
and international pressure Japan's political leadership expanded the meaning
of Article 9 to that of permitting the SDF to go abroad within self-defensive
limits.
C. Japan's Electorate
Japan's populace is the third factor in the interpretation of Article 9.
For example, elements of Japan's pacifist views were incorporated into the
LDP's postwar security strategy as is evident from the continued resistance to
all-out armament, the abstention from international power politics, and the
rejection of nuclear weapons. 10 7  For over forty years much of Japan's
electorate supported the defensive use of force expressed in the government's
1959 interpretation of Article 9.108
From a theoretical perspective, it is apparent that Article 9's
interpretation has changed without formal amendment because of the popular
acceptance of this notion. 10 9 One legal scholar postulates a citizen-led model
of change:
103 Shibata, supra note 89, at 218.
104 Id.
'o5 Id. Had Iraq had not consented to the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, the Peacekeeping
Law may have prohibited SDF involvement.
06 Id. at 232-33. In Articles XXII to XXIV of the Law Concerning Cooperation in U.N.
Peacekeeping and Other Operations, "small-sized weapons" presumably means side arms.
To some, the conditions Japan has placed upon itself for participation in international peacekeeping
efforts are at odds with the collective and cooperative spirit of U.N. operations. Shibata, supra note 89, at
332. After passing the Peacekeeping Law, Japan took a more active role in U.N. activities. It sent three
electoral monitors to Angola to participate in the U.N. Angola Verification Mission, more than 680
personnel including a 600-member SDF ground unit to Cambodia to participate in the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia, and a 48-member SDF transport unit to Mozambique to participate in the U.N.
Operations in Mozambique. Id. at 308.
107 PYLE, supra note 16, at 46.
'0' The Sunakawa decision discussed earlier remains the law and Japan has not seriously considered
another interpretation. Haley, supra note 61.
109 Royer, supra note 11, at 798.
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[T]here exists no legal method for deciding whether the
effectiveness of a constitutional text has been lost; nor is there a
legal method for demonstrating the legal confidence of the
citizenry, which decides that actual situations have changed into
new norms."
10
Another states:
If one asks who inevitably approves the value of norms, the
answer is the citizenry. Transformation does not arise solely
through interpretations by the Diet or the court; the Constitution
can only be said to have transformed when the public awareness
that approves these interpretations is settled. 11
Others disagree as to the extent of public influence on the interpretation
of Article 9112 Rather, they argue, the elites who have ruled Japan for over a
century have had the greatest influence on the meaning of Article 9.113 Even
after their importance declined during the 1970s, paternalistic Japanese
bureaucrats still wield great political and moral authority over the public." 4
At least up until the mid-1990s, the citizenry believed what their leaders told
them about the meaning of Article 9.115 Overall, however, Japan's populace
has contributed to Article 9's interpretation by insisting on self-defensive
limits for all security-related matters.
10 Kasuya, supra note 36, at 17. Kasuya refers to Naoki Kobayashi's transformation theory:
The so-called "transformation" phenomenon occurs in one of two situations: (a) when an
established condition or act, which constitutes an evasion of the law, is historically or
sociologically necessary and, therefore, the conventional meaning of an applicable legal
provision is lost and becomes unrealistic and unsuitable in the normative consciousness of the
people; or, (b) when an irreversibly established condition continues to exist over a long period,
the denial of which would plainly result in great social harm.
Id.
II Kasuya, supra, note 36, at 21 (discussing T. Fukase, KenpJ no Heiwa Shugi to Saiban [The
Constitution's Pacifism and the Court], 35 KOHO KENKYO 57 (1973)).
112 PYLE, supra note 16, at 107. See also Gwen Robinson, Japan Strains Grow Over Defense Pact,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1997, at 4.
113 PYLE, supra note 16, at 107.
I' d. at 107-11.
11 Japan's once near-infallible bureaucrats are currently in discredit. See Only 90 Government
Corruption Cases in 1996, JAPAN TIMES (Internet Edition), Dec. 29, 1997; Osaka Reveals Abuse of 1.33
Billion Yen In Taxpayer's Funds, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 25, 1997; Tokyo Avoids Disclosure of Dining
Expenses, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 26, 1997.
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D. Expression of the Legal Rule
The meaning of Article 9 depends on the three factors addressed
above. Primarily, Article 9's meaning is a balance between Japan's
disinclined Supreme Court, a government beset by domestic and international
pressures, and a pacifist electorate. Article 9 is much more than a
constitutional provision or legal principle. It is an entire system for Japan to
sort out its use of military force. In the end, the provision says whatever the
political consensus says it means depending on the circumstances at any point
in time. As a result, Article 9 will be interpreted broadly enough to address
new threats to Japan's territorial security as they arise. The 1997 Guidelines
respond to military threats to Japan and therefore must be assessed according
to the terms of Article 9.
IV. THE 1997 DEFENSE GUIDELINES
A. Provisions
The 1960 Treaty provides for subsequent agreements, such as the 1997
Guidelines, to address contemporary issues.' 1 6 In 1978, the major issue in the
alliance was budgetary. 1 7 This issue resulted in the first set of Guidelines." i8
16 1960 Treaty, supra note 5, art. VI.
"' Henry Scott-Stokes, Japan Will Pay More of the Cost of Keeping U.S. Military There, NEW YORKTIMES, Nov. 10, 1978, at A4. Up until 1978, the U.S. provided for Japan's security by assuming two-thirds of
thebill. New Action Guidelines, Japan, US. Okay New Action Guidelines, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 28, 1978.
"' 1978 Guidelines, supra note, 3; New Action Guidelines, supra note 117. The 1978 Guidelines
marked a change in this policy to a more equitable distribution of the growing monetary costs of housing
American troops on Japanese territory. Id. Japan still was not asked to assume anything near a credible,
self-reliant posture of self-defense, however. Id. Primarily, the 1978 Guidelines outlined a way for Japan
to begin paying for its share of the sky-rocketing cost of strategic defense. Scott-Stokes, supra note 117.
Some observers said this meant Japan was rearming and becoming a military power. New Action
Guidelines, supra note 117. Japan's government insisted this was not the case. US. Called On to Share
Latest Defense Technology With Japan, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 23, 1978.
At that time, almost eighteen years had passed since the US-Japan Security Consultation Committee
("SCC") had first met to set out the 1978 Guidelines. The process for reworking the old Guidelines began
in April 1996, at the summit between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto.
Tokyo, Washington Issue New Guidelines On Defense, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 24, 1997, at 1. The SCC, led
by Secretary of State Madeline Albright for the U.S. and Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi for Japan,
released its Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in New York
City on September 23, 1997. COMPLETION OF THE REVIEW, supra note 2. It outlined the supportive role
Japan would provide the U.S. military in times of peace, during armed attacks on Japan, and in times of
emergencies in "areas surrounding Japan." 1997 GUIDELINES, supra note 3.
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In 1997, the issues facing the alliance were both strategic and logistic in
nature. 
119
Aiming to meet both needs, the stated purpose of the 1997 Guidelines
is to "provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and
missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both
under normal circumstances and during contingencies.' 20  This overarching
goal is based on several major and continuing premises. Most importantly,
existing security arrangements between the countries will be maintained.' 2'
Preserving these arrangements requires that the U.S. maintain its nuclear
deterrent capability, and its forwardly deployed forces. 122 Another premise is
that Japan will conduct any and all actions within the pre-established limits of
Article 9, in accordance with its "exclusively defense-oriented" policy and
three non-nuclear principals.12 3  Although neither government is obligated to
take any particular legislative, administrative, or budgetary actions, each is
expected to take whatever steps are necessary to honor their respective
commitments.124  And finally, the 1997 Guidelines articulate each party's
response to the four scenarios described below.
1. Cooperation in Situations in and Around Japan
In response to an armed attack against Japan, Section V of the
Guidelines provides for bilateral actions to repel advancing forces, with the
primary responsibility lying with Japan and reinforcement by the U.S. "as
appropriate." Regardless of whether air, sea, or ground operations are
conducted, the U.S. is limited to a supplemental role.126  Activities and
19 Strategically, it was the continuing instability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Straits
that illustrated the need to revisit the Defense Guidelines in 1997. These issues are discussed later in
Section B of this Comment.
Logistically, it was unclear if wounded American soldiers could be treated at Japanese hospitals or if
U.S. forces could use Japanese air or seaports in a conflict. Manning, supra note 7. In the event
American lives are lost defending South Korea or in a violent outcome of Taiwan's reunification with
China, and Japan does nothing to help, the U.S. would consider such inaction to be material breach of the
treaty-regardless of Japan's explicit legal obligations. James Shinn, Testing the United States-Japan
Security Alliance, 96 CURRENT HiST.-AsIA 425 (1997). The expected negative public reaction the U.S.
and other major western allies will have to Japan declining to aid the U.S. is unacceptable to either
government. Id
120 1997 GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § I.
IZ' Id. § 11:1.
122 1997 GUIDELINES, supra note 5, § III.
12' Id. § 11:2.
124 Id. § 11:4.
121 Id. §IV:l,2(a).
126 Id. § IV:2 (c)(2).
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requirements for operations include command and coordination, bilateral
coordination mechanisms, electronic communication, shared intelligence,
mutual logistical support, supply, transportation, maintenance, facilities, and
medical services. 127 Cooperation in situations around Japan that affect its
security is carefully defined as "not geographical," but "situational."' 28 The
two governments will make "every effort, including diplomatic measures, to
prevent such situations from occurring.',
12 9
The heavy emphasis on coordination and mutual assistance creates
ambiguity in this section of the Guidelines. It is unclear what role the parties
have in some circumstances. 130  If both governments are aware of and
participating in an event with potential for combat, based on Section V, it is
conceivable Japan would be expected to use force in a manner inconsistent
with Article 9.
2. Search & Rescue and Evacuation
Section V calls for U.S.-Japan cooperation in search and rescue
missions within Japanese territory and in the seas surrounding Japan,
noncombatant evacuation, and activities "ensuring effectiveness of economic
sanctions" for maintenance of international peace and stability. 131  This
language raises questions about who would provide support tantamount to
enforcement and assertive self-defense (i.e., a preemptive strike) in an
incident where both treaty partners were required to use force. For example,
rescuing parties under attack where Japan attempts to intervene and rescue
might cause the aggressor to identify Japanese forces as party to the conflict
and attack the SDF. The same issue is raised for the scenario of retrieving
noncombatants from a third-party country with similar circumstances where
SDF personnel could draw the fire of one of the combatants even though the
SDF was not party to the conflict. Although the Guidelines assume Japan
will act in accordance with its constitution, they do not proscribe actions at
the upper limits of assertive self-defense under "bilateral military"
circumstances. 132
127 Id. § IV:3.
128 id. § v.
129 id.
130 Tokyo, Washington Issue New Guidelines On Defense, supra note 121; Tetsushi Kajimoto, SDF
Faces Tough Battle In Meeting New Demands, JAPAN TIMES, Sept., 24, 1997, at 1, 4.
131 1997 GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § V:3(d).
132 id.
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3. Battlefield Rear Area Support
Section V of the Guidelines creates the greatest Article 9 issues.
Vague references to the "rear area support" Japan would provide U.S. forces
during combat raise questions that traditionally make Japanese leaders
nervous about international commitments and the Japanese people angry they
might be violating their pacifist morals: 33
The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S.
Forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective
manner. By its very nature, Japan's rear area support will be
provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided
on the high seas and [in] international airspace around Japan
which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are
being conducted. 1
34
Despite the textual distinction between support and combat areas,
assisting U.S. forces on "the high seas and [in] international airspace"
necessarily raises the possibility of the SDF encountering North Korean or
Chinese forces engaged in acts of war. 135 A plausible scenario of this kind is
one in which the U.S. would direct the SDF to enforce a blockade around
Japan to prevent spillover conflict from nearby hostilities while the U.S.
conducted more direct engagements elsewhere. 136 A blockade of this kind
presents a combined legal-political problem for Japan because of the small a
difference between preemptive self-defense and aggression. 137 The more
Japan's blockade duty is seen as helping the U.S. and less directly that of
defending Japan, the more likely the SDF will appear as an aggressor.'38
Because the difference between preemptive self-defense and aggression may
seem only conceptual, the mere advocacy of the right to use force in assertive
self-defense is most likely objectionable to the Japanese public.'39
The legal issues Section V raises are tied to the close confines of
Northeast Asian geography. Japan would almost inevitably have to play a'
role if there was war on the Korean peninsula, regardless of whether the U.N.
133 Kajimoto, supra note 130.
134 1997 GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § V:4(b) (emphasis added).
:1s Kajimoto, supra note 130.
136 id
137 Id.
138 id.
139 Robinson, supra note 112.
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or the U.S. is conducting the defensive operations. 14' Korea is simply too
close for Japan to remain unaffected. 141 The Taiwan Straits are more remote
geographically, but Japan is the balancing Asian power to China and could
not remain uninvolved with hostilities so close at least to the extent it wants
to keep its alliance with the U.S. intact politically. 142 Deciding in advance
where U.S. forces and the SDF will be and what role they each will have is
prudent for deterrence and is an effective way to minimize loss of life in these
contingencies.
Thus, where Japan deploys the SDF in Northeast Asia outside the
immediate Japan archipelago and uses defensive force to support or
compliment U.S. forces conducting operations affecting the defense of Japan,
the force will be compatible with Article 9. In any event, Section V of the
1997 Guidelines creates authority in bilateral agreements between the U.S.
and Japan by permitting Japan to, and creating expectations it will, use force
in a still limited but growing set of circumstances.
4. Implementation
The Guidelines are not legally self-implementing. 143 The Japanese Diet
is now grappling with the politically arduous task of passing the necessary
legislation allowing implementation of the Guidelines with predictions of
enactment in late 1998.144 Public opposition to any increased role for the
SDF is strong. 145 Consequently, the Diet lacks the political will to confront
security issues directly. 146 "Hashimoto's government is a perfect example of
risk-adverse consensus coalitions," notes one observer. 147 "[T]he Prime
Minister would rather expose the alliance to a window of vulnerability than
face splitting his fragile governing coalition with a decision on the question of
collective self-defense.' 48 Hashimoto's sagging public approval ratings and
multiple political attacks from opponents make observers doubt his ability to
140 Shinn, supra note 119, at 430.
'"' Id at 430.
142 id.
143 1997 GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § II:4; New Defense Guide Defines More Mature Japan-US.
Ties, DEFENSE NEWS, Sept. 29, 1997, at 19.
144 Tetsushi Kajimoto, Cabinet Approves Bills Expanding SDF Overseas Role, JAPAN TIMES WEEKLY
INT'L, May 4, 1988, at 3. The Diet is currently considering the issue.
141 Interview with Japan SDF Agency official (Dec. 5, 1997) (on file with author); Shinn, supra
note 119, at 427.
146 Id. at 425-26.
"' Id at 428.
148 id
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pass something so controversial. 149 With reports the Social Democrats will
leave the coalition government, 150 it appears that incremental steps may be the
best Japan is able to take at this time.'
As has occurred repeatedly in the past, however, Japan's leaders will
rely on U.S. pressure to accomplish a difficult, domestic objective.15 2 Japan
does not always act in its own self-interest when it comes to security matters,
as Japan's exploitation of the U.S. security guarantee and reluctance to deal
with defense issues demonstrates.'53  Defense as an issue paralyzes Japan.
Even after it agrees in private with the U.S. on a course of action, it must rely
on the U.S. to convince it of the legitimacy of its own action and then to
muster the political will to carry out the task. 154 Judging from the political,
legal, and social factors in the interpretation of Article 9, where the 1997
Defense Guidelines present a solution to the current threats Japan faces from
the Korean peninsula and China, Japan will declare them constitutional and
pass necessary implementing legislation. 155 Given that the U.S. has been
pushing Japan since the 1970s to assume more of the burden for its own
defense, and taking into account the fear of these threats, Japan will almost
assuredly adopt the 1997 Guidelines.
B. The Guidelines and U.S. Foreign Policy
The implementation of the Guidelines by Japan is a critical step in U.S.
long-term foreign policy for Northeast Asia. 5 6 By clarifying the wartime
roles of the U.S. and Japan, the Guidelines promote what should be the
central United States goal of impelling Japan to act more like a leader by
shifting more of the region's security burden to Japan. 157  This section
examines the recent developments in Northeast Asia that required
development of the Guidelines and then makes recommendations for U.S.
policy for the region.
149 Tokyo Considers Legislation to Support New U.S -Japan Defense Guidelines, JEI REPORT No. 10
(Mar. 13, 1998).
'5o Japan's Social Democratic Party to Leave Ruling Coalition, AFX NEWS, May 1, 1998.
151 Shinn, supra note 119, at 430.
152 PYLE, supra note 16, at 75-76, 111-12.
153 See discussion beginning at note 87.
154 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155 See supra discussion beginning in section II C of this Comment, in the text beginning after note 115.
56 Cohen, supra note 6.
157 See supro notes 33-36, 41-48 and accompanying text.
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1. The Need to Revise the Alliance
U.S. foreign policy toward Japan for much of the post-cold war period
has been to encourage Japan to take a more active leadership role in
Northeast Asia appropriate to its great economic power without upsetting the
region.1 58 The largest reason why this goal has yet to be realized is because
of Japan's failure to acknowledge its role as an aggressor in WWII.159 Japan
will not apologize to Asia because, rather than seeing itself as an aggressor in
WWHI, it sees itself as a victim.160 As a result, anytime Japan considers
changing its passive military role to that of an active role, Japan's neighbors
loudly object.16 1
As an expression of U.S. containment policy, the U.S.-Japan security
alliance worked well during the cold war. However, the reasons for which
the alliance was forged, containment of Soviet and Japanese aggression, no
longer pose the same threat. 162  The alliance has yet to adjust to new
circumstances. 163 For example, in the postwar period, U.S. allies have grown
in economic power relative to itself164 China has begun to assert itself as a
regional military power. 165 The Korean Peninsula now must contend with the
nuclear factor. 166 North Korea's compliance with the agreement it made with
the U.S. in 1994 may be unraveling because the U.S. has been slow to
produce the promised aid.1
67
Perhaps the most glaring evidence of the alliance's failure to adjust is
the Persian Gulf War, where Japan, the world's second-largest economic and
military power, did not send troops to aid allies against Iraq. 168 The Taiwan
Straits crisis of a year ago 69 and the continuing tension on the Korean
peninsula' 70 reinforce Japan's need for protection and for overall stability.
' PYLE, supra note 16, at 28, 34-36; Auer, supra note 29, at 77-78.
s9 PYLE. supra note 16, at 17.
160 id.
161 See infra note 210.
162 Shinn, supra note 119, at 425.
163 id.
164 Hellmann, supra note 14, at 238.
163 Shinn, supra note 119, at 426; Audry Tan, Japan and China Must Reconcile, BuSINESS TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1997, at 2.
'66 Shinn, supra note 119, at 426.
167 Elisabeth Rosenthal, North Korea Says it Will Unseal Reactor, NEW YORK TIMES, May 13,
1998, at AlO.
'6 See PYLE, supra note 16, at 128-29; see also Balls, supra note 88.
169 See More Agony Than Its Worth?, STRAITS TIMES, June 10, 1997. at 28.
170 Shinn, supra note 119, at 426.
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Finally, the 1998 Asian financial crisis has introduced even more instability
into the region. 1
71
Japan's self-imposed limits on the use of force, other than in defense of
the Japanese islands have permitted positive but qualified collaboration
between its SDF and the U.S. military. Yet, Japan's apathy towards non-
economic international concerns continues unabated to this day. 172 The
contradiction between Japan's dependency on U.S.-created global financial
institutions and security regimes on the one hand, and its failure to act more
like a leader in meeting its obligations to maintain the international system on
the other, is straining its credibility and is a driving reason to revise the
alliance. The contradiction is an unusual one. As one scholar notes: "If, as
some Japanese critics have charged, this is not really an alliance at all but
rather a patron-client relationship, then it is a peculiar relationship, one in
which the patron commits to the defense of the client and the client commits
to little in return.', 173
2. Northeast Asia
The 1997 Guidelines were developed as a strategic response to recent
developments in Northeast Asia. For example, the Taiwan Straits incident in
March 1996174 stemmed from the enduring question of Taiwan's reunification
with mainland China.' 75  Just before the 1996 elections in Taiwan, its
president publicly suggested it might not reunify with China. 176 In response,
China's leaders staged military exercises in the Taiwan Straits in a dramatic
show of force. 177 The missile test firings and mock blockade of Taiwan
generated great fear in neighboring Japan. 17 8 Moreover, the incident raised
questions of whether the U.S. would have to defend Taiwan if China used
171 Stanley Roth, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian & Pacific Affairs, Prepared
Statement before the House International Relations Committee (May 7, 1998).172 Conversation with Yoshio Uchiyama, Senior Diplomatic Consul for Seattle, in Olympia, Wash.
(Feb. 19, 1998).
:73 Shinn, supra note 119, at 425.]74 JEt REPORT No. 11, supra note 144.
115 H"ARRY HARN, A FRAGILE RELATIONSHIP: THEUNITED STATES ANDCHINA SINCE 1972, at 13 (1992).
176 See Melvin Goo, Military Provocations Discredited, Nikkei Weekly, April 1, 1996, at 7.
177 Id.
178 More Agony Than It's Worth?, supra note 169. One of the missile target zones was just 60 km
from the Japanese island of Yonaguni, on which about 1,700 Japanese live. Hijiri Inose, China Missiles
Wake-Up Call to Japan?, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Mar. 18, 1996.
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force to reclaim Taiwan and whether Japan would be expected to help the
U.S. in some way.
179
China was only a minor threat to Japan when the Soviet Red Army was
deployed at the Sino-Soviet border.180 Now that China has emerged in the
last decade from its self-imposed isolation, however, it does so with the
reminder it was a competitor with Japan before the cold war.'8 ' A modem
and technologically-developed economy is now China's primary goal and a
major, multi-generational undertaking.18 2 And although China is revitalizing
its national defense forces, military domination of East Asia is not its aim.
183
Since the return of Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Sprately Islands are its only
territorial ambitions.' 84 China's final ambition is international acceptance as
an equal to the world's great leaders.'
85
The U.S.-Japan, U.S.-China and China-Japan relationships compose a
geopolitical triangle in a region lacking mediating institutions such as an
Asian NATO, European Union, or any formal regional security structures.
186
The network of bilateral security ties the U.S. has individually with Japan,
South Korea, Southeast Asian nations, and Australia is the uncoordinated and
only regional security in east Asia.' 87 There are signs of potential, regional
security cooperation outside this traditional framework, such as the
Association of South East Asia Nations ("ASEAN") Regional Forum, but
they are tentative and undeveloped as of yet.188  It is important for these
relationships to be successful due to the fact the U.S., Japan, and China
compose nearly half of the world's gross product and support three of the
world's largest militaries.'
89
Korea is the powder keg. 190 In 1994, tensions increased on the Korean
Peninsula when North Korea threatened to build a nuclear power plant
19 Shinn, supra note 119, at 430.
18o Shinn, supra note 140, at 426.
181 Id.
182 Speech by Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, in Why the China-U.S.-Japan Balance
of Power Is So Vital, STRAITS TIMES, Sept. 13, 1997, at 54.
..3 Interview with David Bachman, Professor of Chinese History, Jackson School of International
Studies, University of Washington (Apr. 10, 1997).
184 Id. China and Japan have not resolved their territorial dispute over this small archipelago.
185 Id.
186 Manning, supra note 7.
187 Id.
188 Satoshi Morimoto, The Security Environment in East Asia, in TOWARD A TRUE ALLIANCE, supra
note 1, at 83, 90.
189 Id.
190 Defense Guidelines, Okinawa and Others Challenge U.S. -Japan Defense Relations, JEI REPORT
No. 5 (Oct. 31, 1997).
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capable of generating weapons grade plutonium.' 91 North Korea claimed it
needed low cost power generation for its starving masses, but the U.S.
strongly suspected it was going to use the plant's deadly by-product for a
nuclear weapons program. 192  The U.S. was alarmed that Japan did not
respond-waiting instead for the U.S. to resolve the situation. 193
A possible clash with North Korean forces is the most likely reason the
U.S. would call on Japan for help. An invasion by the North into the South
would be particularly bloody. 94 It is also possible that Pyongyang harbors
medium-range nuclear missiles capable of reaching Japan and the will
necessary to launch them. 95  The fact Japan has little interest in
accommodating these scenarios or any other contingency in Asia is the basic
disagreement over the purpose of the alliance and a central, if unspoken,
reason why the U.S. sought to revise the Guidelines. 196
3. The Japanese Archipelago
American troops stationed in the Japanese archipelago and South Korea
have had a variety of missions since their deployment at the end of WWII.197
The most obvious mission has been to maintain a strategic alliance primarily
against the now-defunct USSR and China north of the Korean peninsula. 98 Less
acknowledged in the modem era is the reason they were deployed in the first
place-to prevent Japan from rearming. 99 Currently, American troops provide
deterrence from a possible invasion of South Korea from the North as well as
additional assurance of protection of the sea lanes around Japan. Japan
compliments the U.S. presence with its own defensive military capability.200
'9' Ju-Yeon Kim, Crisis Deepens as Inter-Korea Talks Collapse. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 19, 1994.
192 id.
193 JEI REPORT no. 5, supra note 190.
194 Interview with Maj. Kurt Taylor, U.S. Army Intelligence Officer (Jan 24, 1998).
'9' Michael O'Hanlon, Theater Missile Defense and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, in TOWARD A TRuEALLIANCE, supra note 1, at 179, 180, 184-85.
196 Shinn, supra note 119, at 427.
97 The original reason for U.S. troops' presence was to reassure Japan's neighbors that they were
safe from further invasions by Japan. PYLE, supra note 16, at 24. Deterring the former Soviet Union and
North Korea has been the major missions of the U.S. military in Northeast Asia over the past 50 years.
Mochizuki, New Bargain, supra note 1, at 10.
19 Id.
199 d.
200 Japan itself spends $50 billion a year on defense. Manning, supra note 7. It has more than 300 fighter
aircraft, twice as many destroyers than the U.S. Seventh Fleet, sophisticated P3C antisubmarine aircraft, 200 F-15's, the most modem aircraft currently flying in U.S. forces, a large number of improved Patriot air-defense
missiles, and the highly sophisticated and deadly Aegis sea-based air-defense system. Auer, supra note 29, at 83.Japan has acquired long-range airborne early-warning and air conflict management aircraft ("AWACS"), tanker
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Despite the SDF's modem capabilities, however, Japan's ability to
weather crises remains suspect.201  As examples, the 1994 Korea nuclear
crisis, 20 2 the 1995 Hanshin earthquake, 20 3 and the 1996 Peru hostage crisis204
raise doubts about whether Japan can provide the kind of response the U.S.
expects from an equal.205 The 1997 Defense Guidelines lay a brick in the
foundation of a credible and reliable defense. But they are not the structure itself.
As a society, Japan's reliance on the U.S. security guarantee exacerbates
domestic problems. Stemming the social malaise caused by the moral failure of
high-level bureaucrats 20 6 will probably require the Japanese equivalent of a
Watergate/Vietnam-type domestic crisis. If Japan was to give its defense policy
the of attention as it has given economic growth, many contradictions in Japan
today would be corrected. Additionally, opening its markets to less fortunate and
underdeveloped Asian neighbors instead of relying on the U.S. for a solution is a
must. If Japan attempts to export itself out of the current Asian financial crisis,
however, it could greatly prolong the recovery period of Asia as a whole.
Whether or not the Guidelines are implemented, Japan should use its
current domestic constitutional debate over their adoption as a basis for
reinterpreting Article 9 to permit collective security. The right to collective
security is recognized in both the U.N. Charter207 and the bilateral security
treaty.2 °8 Committing to a collective security regime would allow Japan to act in
concert with other nations in furtherance of international peace and not just in its
aircraft, and long-range/road area Over-the-Horizon Radar. Id As a result, even though Japan will keep its
defense spending very close to one percent of its Gross National Product, it will possess (at least the equipment
for) very advanced air and sea defense which would make it very difficult for aircraft or ships to move through
the Sea of Japan undetected by the SDF. Id
201 Mochizuki, Strategic Debates, supra note 1. at 57.
202 Kim, supra note 191; Manning, supra note 7.
203 Defense Guidelines, Okinawa and Others Challenge U.S.-Japan Defense Relations, supra note
190. In January 1995, the Kobe metropolitan region of Japan suffered a terrible earthquake. Many
perished. Worse, relief efforts were hampered because the pacifist Socialist Prime Minister was
ideologically opposed to using the SDF for any reason whatsoever. Many deaths could have been
prevented had the government taken better initiative. Id.
204 Id. In a manner similar to the above events, the Japanese government was slow to respond to the
late 1996 crisis in Lima, Peru where many Japanese were caught inside the Japanese embassy when
terrorists took over the compound. Id.
205 Shinn, supra note 119, at 425.
206 See Only 90 Government Corruption Cases in 1996, supra note 115; Osaka Reveals Abuse of
1.33 Billion Yen In Taxpayer's Fund, supra note 115; Tokyo Avoids Disclosure of Dining Expenses, supra
note 115.27 U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para 1.
208 KENPO, supra note 10; Mike Mochizuki, et. at, Policy Recommendations, in TOWARD A TRUE
ALLIANCE, supra note 1, at 193, 196-97.
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own defense.20 9 Collective security would also allow Japan to set its own goals
rather than passively letting the U.S. provide the initiative.
4. Recommendations for U.S. Policy
The U.S-Japan security alliance should continue to provide strong
deterrence, reassurance, and crisis response. To these ends, the 1997
Guidelines represent a measured and successful way to kill two birds, the
threats posed by China and North Korea, with one stone. The public
announcement of the Guidelines serve as a delicate reminder to both China
and North Korea that the U.S.-Japan security alliance will be invoked if
conditions so require. China and South Korea's urgent response to the
announcement of 1997 Guidelines was surprising considering that the
Guidelines represent only a minor development in the role of the SDF. 210 To
alleviate regional instability, when the Guidelines are found constitutional, the
U.S. should implement the following recommendations.
First, the U.S. must take advantage of the urgency caused in China and
on the Korean peninsula by the announcement of the Guidelines to revitalize
cooperation between South Korea and Japan. A NATO-like organization
should be created between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. The urgency
from the Guidelines' announcement should also be used to continue to
integrate China into the international system by making it more dependent on
its workings and more rewarding if it does. China's long-term interests, such
as modernization through membership in international organizations,211
should be linked to security cooperation in Northeast Asia.
Second, the U.S. must begin to see Japan as a true equal if it expects
Japan to give up its dependency on the American security guarantee and
begin acting like an international leader. As mentioned above, this requires
encouraging Japan to continue to reinterpret its constitution to permit
collective security. 212 The viability of this policy depends on the nature of
short and long-term threats. The reunification of Korea is a relatively short-
term threat that will come to a head through either a military conflict or a
peaceful resolution in the next decade or two. Resuscitation of the
209/id.
210 See China Warns Japan Against Widening Defense Cooperation, THE JAPAN TIMES, Sept., 26,
1997; and South Korea Slams Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept.
25, 1997, supra note 115,211 The World Trade Organization or G-8, for example. Mochizuki, et. al., Policy
Recommendations, supra note 1, at 200-01.
212 Mochizuki, Strategic Debates, supra note 68, at 57-58.
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beleaguered Asian economies obviously must also be short-term. The
accommodation and integration of China into the international realm,
however, is a much more long-term goal. Together, Japan and the U.S. can
steady the Korean conflict and promote peaceful and productive Chinese
reunification. Also together, the U.S. and Japan can provide open markets to
revitalize the short-term economic self-destruction of South Korea, Indonesia,
and Cambodia.
Lastly, and most importantly, and in order for the other two goals to
have a chance for success, the U.S. must support Japan in making a
meaningful apology for WWII.213 This single issue more than any other can
eliminate Japan's security problems. 21 4  Significantly, and in contrast to
Japan, Germany has confronted its past in earnest.21 5 But because of this
omission, Japan lives in dread of its neighbors' disgust and
misunderstanding.216
Genuine reconciliation with her neighbors would ameliorate the need
for U.S. troops in Japan. The U.S. must eventually remove these troops from
Asia. This move will free up crucial territory in South Korea for residential
and commercial activities and lessen the burdens on Okinawa. 2 17  The
removal of the troops would raise Japan's costs for defense in the near-term,
but would lower them dramatically in the long run. If Japan's neighbors are
not threatened by Japan, they likely would not object to Japan leading U.N.
peacekeeping and enforcement operations.
In the unlikely event that Japan finds the Guidelines unconstitutional, it
will embarrass its ally, the U.S., and weaken the alliance by showing it cannot
deliver what it commits to publicly. In this case, the U.S. will have to rebuild
relations with Japan to learn what it is willing to do to in order to deter
hostilities near its islands. Should events follow this course, the U.S. should
shift its policy emphasis to encourage Japan to amend Article 9 to permit
collective security.218 Such an amendment would allow Japan to provide for
its own security without self-defense limitations. An acknowledgment of its
213 PYLE, supra note 16 at 16-17
214 Id. at 17
215 id.
216 More Consultation Needed on Security, DAILY YOMIYURI, Sept. 26, 1997.
217 The presence of the U.S. troops in Okinawa creates great strain on the local population. Noise
from over-flying jets, artillery practice, and weapons maneuvers as well as pollution, crime and loss of
valuable farming land are greatly resented. See Chalmers Johnson, The Okinawan Rape Incident and the
End of the Cold War in EastAsia, 27 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 389, 395-96 (1997).
21 8 Amendment to the Japanese Constitution requires two-thirds majority vote in the lower House of
Japan's Diet and subsequent ratification by the people through special referendum. KENPO
[CONSTITUTION], art. 96. Finally, the Emperor shall promulgate the amendment. Id.
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wrongdoing in WWII in this case is all the more necessary on Japan's part
because of the great apprehension Japan's neighbors have of any change in its
military role in Asia.
In sum, the U.S. security guarantee prevents Japan from acting like a
self-sufficient country. The U.S. should reorient its policy to withdraw fr6m
the role of Japan's protector wherever possible. The U.S. should also treat
Japan, a counterpart that has made amazing accomplishments in the last
century, as an equal. Only then can the United States consider what it would
be like to work on more equal footing with Japan. The new ally would not
always agree, but the U.S. would not have to push its weight around every
time there was an international crisis. In its part of the world, the strong new
ally would already be engaged in a solution that the U.S. could support.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines represent a minor escalation
in Japan's military role in the U.S.-Japan security alliance, a minor legal
enhancement to the Security Treaty, and a major symbolic move to Japan's
electorate and neighboring Asian countries. Japan's likely determination that
the Guidelines are constitutional will help Japan place one foot in front of the
other on the slow path to self-sufficiency and stability in Northeast Asia.
Such difficulty in assuming international responsibilities appropriate to its
power and importance reflects the suspension of natural forces in Japan
created by the United State's security guarantee.
Japan, seemingly boxed into a situation with no escape, must choose
the option under its nose-apology for its past. Only then will differences
like those between the 1978 and 1997 Guidelines receive the small attention
they deserve. The stage will be set for Article 9 to be amended and Japan
will develop a more typical security policy. In this context, Korea will
eventually reunify. China will assert itself and become a participant in the
community of nations. And finally, barring glaring errors in judgment on the
part of the U.S. or Japanese governments, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance,
with its newest addition, the 1997 Defense Guidelines, will be the tool used
to smooth the bumps in the coming decades.
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